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Abstract	  
Geoengineering,	  especially	  its	  fast	  and	  high-­‐leverage	  versions,	  is	  often	  justified	  as	  a	  necessary	  
response	  to	  future	  climate	  emergencies.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  take	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘necessity’	  in	  
international	  law	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  assessing	  how	  rapid,	  high-­‐leverage	  geoengineering	  might	  be	  
justified	  legally.	  The	  need	  to	  specify	  reliably	  ‘grave	  and	  imminent	  peril’	  makes	  such	  a	  justification	  
difficult	  because	  our	  scientific	  ability	  to	  predict	  abrupt	  climate	  change,	  for	  example	  as	  tipping	  
elements,	  is	  limited.	  The	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  establish	  scientific	  consensus	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  acceptance	  
restricts	  the	  scope	  for	  effective	  forewarning	  and	  so	  pre-­‐emptive	  justifications	  for	  geoengineering	  
become	  more	  tempting.	  	  While	  recognising	  that	  dangerous,	  large-­‐scale	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  
are	  becoming	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  avoid,	  the	  pre-­‐emptive,	  emergency	  frame	  is	  problematic.	  We	  
suggest	  that	  arguments	  from	  emergency	  operate	  on	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  tend	  towards	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  draft	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  ‘post-­‐print’	  version	  made	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  Edinburgh	  
Research	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  The	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hubristic	  attempts	  to	  shape	  the	  future,	  as	  well	  as	  tending	  to	  close	  down	  rather	  than	  open	  up	  space	  
for	  deliberation.	  We	  conclude	  that	  ignoring	  or	  repressing	  the	  emergency	  frame	  is	  a	  dangerous	  
response	  and	  that	  more	  effort	  is	  required	  to	  defuse	  and	  disarm	  emergency	  rhetoric.	  
	  
Introduction	  
Geoengineering	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  deliberate	  large-­‐scale	  manipulation	  of	  the	  planetary	  
environment	  to	  counteract	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change.1	  	  While	  geoengineering	  has	  been	  
discussed	  as	  a	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  since	  at	  least	  the	  1960s2	  it	  remained	  marginal	  and	  has	  
only	  entered	  into	  the	  academic	  and	  policy	  mainstream	  as	  a	  climate	  policy	  option	  alongside	  the	  
conventional	  options	  of	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation	  in	  the	  last	  decade.1	  Geoengineering	  could	  
potentially	  be	  done	  either	  by	  limiting	  the	  influx	  of	  solar	  energy	  (solar	  radiation	  management,	  SRM)	  
or	  by	  removing	  CO2	  or	  other	  greenhouse	  gases	  from	  the	  atmosphere	  (carbon	  dioxide	  removal,	  CDR).	  
Some	  technologies,	  such	  as	  injection	  of	  sulphate	  particles	  in	  the	  stratosphere,	  seem	  to	  offer	  the	  
potential	  for	  relatively	  rapid	  and	  cheap	  deployment	  while	  others,	  such	  as	  air	  capture,	  offer	  less	  
controversial,	  longer-­‐term	  options.3,4	  There	  has	  also	  been	  ample	  critique,	  based	  not	  least	  in	  the	  fact	  
that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  know	  in	  advance	  what	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  interventions	  may	  be	  and	  thus	  a	  
risk	  of	  serious	  unintended	  consequences,	  but	  also	  based	  in	  questions	  about	  the	  morality	  of	  any	  such	  
intervention,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  well-­‐developed	  regulatory	  frameworks.1,5,6	  	  
The	  growing	  interest	  in	  geoengineering	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  relied	  on	  an	  emergency	  framing	  in	  
two	  main	  ways.a	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  potential	  threat	  of	  abrupt,	  non-­‐linear	  climate	  events,	  such	  as	  
rapid	  tundra	  or	  ice	  cap	  melt,	  which	  had	  been	  discussed	  in	  science	  previously,	  gained	  policy	  traction	  
in	  the	  1990s.	  In	  a	  context	  in	  which	  policy-­‐makers	  had	  historically	  favoured	  forms	  of	  climate	  science	  
that	  placed	  less	  emphasis	  on	  abrupt	  climate	  change	  and	  more	  on	  gradual,	  long-­‐duration	  shifts,	  
geoengineering	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  potential	  mechanism	  through	  which	  we	  might	  prepare	  some	  
form	  of	  response	  to	  abrupt	  climate	  emergencies.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  emerged	  a	  diffuse	  sense	  
that	  there	  was	  an	  emergency	  within	  climate	  policy	  itself.	  The	  mainstreaming	  of	  geoengineering	  was	  
a	  reaction	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  conventional	  mitigation	  measures,	  and	  a	  concern	  that	  new	  options	  were	  
required.7	  Notably,	  only	  SRM	  technologies	  are	  expected	  to	  function	  fast	  enough	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  the	  
kind	  of	  abrupt	  events	  typically	  referred	  to	  as	  emergencies.	  This	  paper	  therefore	  focusses	  on	  rapid,	  
high-­‐leverage	  interventions	  used	  to	  prevent	  emergency,	  and	  we	  will	  use	  the	  term	  ‘geoengineering’	  
as	  short-­‐hand	  for	  this.	  
Arguably,	  explicit	  emergency	  frames	  have	  become	  less	  dominant	  as	  the	  field	  has	  moved	  towards	  
greater	  respectability	  and	  wider	  acceptance.	  Now,	  frames	  include	  that	  of	  a	  ‘healing’	  technology,	  as	  
well	  as	  talk	  of	  policy	  bundles,	  wedges	  or	  portfolios,	  all	  marking	  a	  general	  attempt	  to	  integrate	  
geoengineering	  into	  broader	  climate	  risk-­‐benefit	  matrices.8	  This	  widening	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  and	  framing	  
of	  geoengineering	  has	  been	  mapped	  by	  Scholte	  et	  al.9	  Yet,	  the	  emergency	  frame	  has	  not	  gone	  away.	  
The	  Tyndall	  Centre,	  for	  example,	  found	  that	  ‘climate	  emergency’	  was	  the	  joint	  most-­‐common	  frame	  
in	  expert	  appraisals	  of	  geoengineering	  along	  with	  insufficient	  mitigation,10	  and	  Nerlich	  and	  Jaspal	  
found	  that	  it	  was	  an	  underlying	  narrative	  in	  scientific	  and	  popular	  discourse.11	  Even	  where	  the	  term	  
‘emergency’	  is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned,	  words	  such	  as	  ‘urgency’	  or	  the	  spectre	  of	  ‘dangerous’	  or	  
‘non-­‐linear’	  or	  ‘abrupt’	  climate	  change	  all	  imply	  an	  emergency	  to	  come.	  Moreover,	  the	  impetus	  
behind	  most	  calls	  for	  research	  into	  the	  possible	  implications	  of	  different	  technologies	  is	  predicated	  
on	  the	  need	  to	  avoid	  geoengineering	  itself	  prompting	  an	  emergency	  through	  unforeseen	  impacts.11	  
However,	  the	  emergency	  framing	  of	  geoengineering	  has	  not	  gone	  without	  scrutiny.	  Gardiner	  set	  out	  
a	  wide-­‐ranging	  critique	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  geoengineering	  (specifically	  sulphate	  aerosol	  injection)	  could	  
be	  a	  necessary	  –	  lesser	  evil	  –	  option	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  imminent	  catastrophe.12	  A	  prominent	  part	  of	  
his	  critique	  is	  that	  the	  lesser	  evil	  argument	  is	  too	  narrowly	  defined	  and	  so	  obscures	  many	  moral	  and	  
political	  issues.	  He	  also	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  especially	  problematic	  in	  a	  context	  where	  moral	  corruption	  
is	  likely,	  that	  is	  where	  those	  who	  contributed	  most	  to	  the	  climate	  problem	  in	  the	  first	  hand	  are	  least	  
likely	  to	  suffer	  its	  adverse	  effects,	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  seek	  excuses	  not	  to	  mitigate.	  
This	  paper	  offers	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  emergency	  frame	  along	  different	  lines.	  Defining	  a	  phenomenon	  as	  
an	  emergency	  implies	  that	  it	  has	  properties	  of	  danger,	  immediacy,	  and	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  unexpected	  
at	  least	  in	  specific	  location	  or	  timing.	  This	  is	  central	  to	  the	  persuasive	  power	  of	  the	  emergency	  frame.	  
The	  notion	  of	  ‘climate	  emergency’,	  however,	  remains	  poorly	  defined.13	  Accounts	  may	  refer	  to	  
climate	  tipping	  points,	  such	  as	  sudden	  large	  methane	  release	  resulting	  from	  the	  thawing	  of	  
permafrost,	  or	  clathrates	  trapped	  in	  the	  sediments	  of	  the	  continental	  shelves14,	  the	  existence	  and	  
nature	  of	  which	  are	  still	  uncertain.2,15	  Generally,	  arguments	  tend	  to	  be	  vague,	  talking	  about	  ‘rapid’	  or	  
‘dangerous’	  climatic	  change,	  with	  limited	  specification.	  The	  rhetorical	  and	  conceptual	  tactic	  here	  is	  
to	  make	  preparation	  for	  geoengineering	  seem	  necessary	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  uncertain	  future.	  The	  
emergency	  frame	  can	  also	  be	  located	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  future	  threats	  of	  many	  kinds	  –	  from	  
terrorism	  to	  financial	  crisis	  to	  zoonosis	  –	  have	  become	  part	  of	  contemporary	  governance	  regimes.16-­‐
19	  From	  this	  work	  we	  know	  that	  once	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  emergency	  is	  in	  place,	  it	  constrains	  and	  shapes	  
the	  responses	  that	  society,	  both	  at	  national	  and	  international	  scales,	  may	  be	  capable	  of	  undertaking.	  
Authors	  have	  identified	  how	  emergencies,	  or	  catastrophes,	  work	  to	  change	  what	  is	  expected	  in	  
normal	  governance,	  politics	  and	  security	  through	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  logic:	  one	  which	  justifies	  action	  in	  
the	  present	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  events	  at	  the	  limit	  of	  imagination	  and	  calculation.20	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  ask:	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  emergency	  frame	  for	  geoengineering?	  In	  what	  
ways	  can	  climate	  emergency	  be	  defined?	  Can	  climate	  emergency	  be	  reliably	  defined,	  and	  what	  role	  
does	  uncertainty	  play	  in	  this	  process?	  We	  suggest	  that	  this	  line	  of	  enquiry	  is	  important	  given	  the	  
sustained	  salience	  of	  the	  emergency	  frame,	  its	  vagueness	  and	  problematic	  pre-­‐emptive	  character.	  
The	  paper	  begins	  by	  taking	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘necessity’	  in	  international	  law	  as	  a	  plausible,	  well	  specified	  
and	  tested	  standard	  for	  assessing	  what	  would	  constitute	  legitimate	  justification	  for	  geoengineering	  
as	  a	  preventative	  emergency	  response,	  and	  argues	  that	  such	  a	  justification	  fails	  to	  meet	  several	  
criteria.	  In	  particular,	  the	  criterion	  of	  ‘grave	  and	  imminent	  peril’	  requires	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  predict	  
the	  occurrence	  of	  climate	  emergencies.	  The	  paper	  therefore	  progresses	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  scope	  for	  
reliable,	  scientific	  prediction	  of	  abrupt	  climate	  change	  –	  conceptualised	  as	  ‘tipping	  elements’	  or	  
otherwise	  –	  to	  underpin	  decisions	  on	  preventative	  deployment.	  A	  very	  limited	  scope	  for	  
scientifically-­‐based	  preventative	  deployment	  is	  identified,	  and,	  given	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  establish	  
scientific	  facts	  as	  well	  as	  wider	  acceptance	  of	  them,	  the	  scope	  for	  effective	  forewarning	  is	  limited	  
indeed.	  The	  final	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  argues	  that	  in	  practice	  this	  unpredictability	  does	  not	  undermine	  
the	  emergency	  logic,	  but	  rather	  sustains	  it.	  The	  emergency	  logic	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  
rather	  than	  precautionary	  orientation	  to	  the	  future	  and	  relies	  on	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  future.	  This	  
is	  problematic,	  since	  invocation	  of	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  emergency	  logic	  also	  tends	  to	  close	  down	  debate	  
and	  legitimise	  otherwise	  unpalatable	  options.	  
	  
2.	  Can	  geoengineering	  be	  justified	  as	  ‘necessity’	  under	  international	  law?	  
Any	  deployment	  of	  geoengineering	  technology	  by	  a	  state	  would	  raise	  questions	  of	  what	  is	  
acceptable	  and	  legitimate	  on	  the	  international	  plane.	  International	  law	  codifies	  such	  norms.	  It	  offers	  
plausible	  precedents	  and	  arguments	  by	  which	  to	  assess	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  geoengineering	  as	  a	  
necessary	  emergency	  response.	  The	  absence	  of	  institutional	  features	  common	  to	  national	  legal	  
systems	  (such	  as	  centralised	  forms	  of	  adjudication)	  sometimes	  leads	  to	  realist	  questioning	  of	  
international	  law’s	  relevance21	  but	  that	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  State-­‐type	  institutions	  are	  the	  exclusive	  
means	  to	  resolve	  collective	  action	  problems.	  Moreover,	  it	  remains	  the	  case	  that	  international	  law	  is	  
very	  rarely	  not	  observed	  by	  those	  bound	  by	  it.22	  	  
	  
Emergency,	  or	  the	  plea	  of	  necessity,	  is	  an	  established	  concept	  in	  international	  law.	  As	  codified	  in	  the	  
International	  Law	  Commission’s	  (ILC)	  draft	  articles,	  and	  reflecting	  international	  customary	  law,	  
necessity	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  “ground	  for	  precluding	  the	  wrongfulness	  of	  an	  act	  not	  in	  conformity	  with	  an	  
international	  obligation	  of	  that	  State.”	  (Ref	  23,	  Article	  25(1)	  at	  p.178).	  At	  first	  glance,	  this	  concept	  
applies	  only	  where	  a	  State	  is	  in	  breach	  of	  any	  of	  its	  international	  obligations.	  Whether	  
geoengineering	  deployment	  would	  constitute	  such	  a	  breach	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  considerable	  
but	  inconclusive	  scholarly	  debate.7,24,25,a	  However,	  international	  law’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
necessity	  also	  provides	  a	  durable	  and	  shared	  understanding	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  
climate	  emergency.	  International	  law’s	  jurisprudence	  on	  necessity	  may	  help	  us	  recognise	  an	  
emergency	  when	  we	  see	  it	  and	  the	  surrounding	  legal	  disputes	  and	  their	  resolution	  tell	  us	  something	  
important	  about	  how	  the	  community	  of	  nations	  responds	  to	  claims	  of	  necessity.	  
As	  may	  be	  expected,	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  emergency	  responses	  can	  be	  justified	  as	  necessities	  
are	  narrow	  (Ref	  23,	  Article	  25(1)(a)	  and	  (b).	  Emphasis	  added):	  	  
1.	  Necessity	  may	  not	  be	  invoked	  by	  a	  State	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  precluding	  the	  wrongfulness	  of	  an	  
act	  not	  in	  conformity	  with	  an	  international	  obligation	  of	  that	  State	  unless	  the	  act:	  (a)	  is	  the	  only	  
way	  for	  the	  State	  to	  safeguard	  an	  essential	  interest	  against	  a	  grave	  and	  imminent	  peril;	  and	  (b)	  
does	  not	  seriously	  impair	  an	  essential	  interest	  of	  the	  State	  or	  States	  towards	  which	  the	  
obligation	  exists,	  or	  of	  the	  international	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
2.	  In	  any	  case,	  necessity	  may	  not	  be	  invoked	  by	  a	  State	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  precluding	  wrongfulness	  
if:	  (a)	  the	  international	  obligation	  in	  question	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  invoking	  necessity;	  or	  
(b)	  the	  State	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  necessity.	  
Let	  us	  unpack	  this	  rather	  dense	  legalese.	  
Consider	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Torrey	  Canyon,	  a	  standard	  example	  of	  necessity	  (Ref	  23,	  at	  179	  ff).26	  In	  1967	  
a	  Liberian	  tanker	  stricken	  off	  Cornwall,	  UK,	  was	  discharging	  quantities	  of	  oil,	  threatening	  significant	  
environmental	  and	  commercial	  damage	  to	  the	  South	  Coast	  and	  Bristol	  Channel.	  It	  was	  deemed	  
permissible	  by	  the	  international	  community	  that	  the	  UK	  bomb	  the	  tanker,	  which	  burnt	  off	  the	  excess	  
oil	  and	  averted	  disaster.26	  The	  UK	  considered	  various	  alternatives	  to	  bombing	  –	  salvage	  attempts	  
were	  unsuccessful	  (and	  led	  to	  the	  death	  of	  the	  captain	  of	  the	  salvage	  team)	  and	  pumping	  off	  the	  oil	  
was	  technically	  impossible	  because	  of	  the	  weather	  –	  and	  took	  steps	  to	  limit	  its	  effect,	  including	  
operations	  with	  detergents	  (Ref	  27,	  col	  38-­‐42).	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  UK’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  situation	  
of	  necessity,	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  risk	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  imminence	  of	  the	  danger	  (Ref	  27,	  col	  
47)	  all	  contributed	  to	  the	  ILC’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  UK’s	  action	  was	  legitimate	  because	  of	  a	  state	  of	  
necessity.	  Bombing	  another	  nation’s	  merchant	  vessel	  would	  otherwise	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  exclusive	  
flag	  state	  jurisdiction.	  
Some	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  examples	  of	  pleas	  of	  necessity	  –	  invariably	  unsuccessful	  –	  arose	  following	  
measures	  (e.g.	  drastic	  devaluation,	  suspension	  of	  tariff	  adjustments)	  taken	  by	  Argentina	  in	  response	  
to	  its	  economic	  crisis	  of	  2001-­‐2,	  which	  caused	  losses	  to	  foreign	  investors	  with	  whom	  the	  country	  had	  
bilateral	  investment	  treaties.	  The	  inability	  of	  Argentina	  to	  convince	  subsequent	  tribunals	  that	  they	  
should	  be	  exempted	  from	  liability	  arising	  from	  these	  treaty	  breaches	  because	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
state	  of	  necessity	  stemmed	  from	  findings	  that	  “the	  measures	  adopted	  were	  not	  the	  only	  steps	  
available”	  (ref	  28,	  ¶128-­‐135).	  The	  central	  matter	  in	  the	  Argentina	  proceedings	  was	  the	  finding	  that	  
“government	  policies	  and	  their	  shortcomings	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  the	  crisis	  and	  emergency”	  
(ref	  29,	  ¶95-­‐96)	  –	  a	  conclusion	  that	  was	  fatal	  for	  the	  plea	  of	  necessity.	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  international	  law	  therefore,	  Article	  25	  and	  the	  customary	  law	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based	  
make	  very	  clear	  that	  necessity	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  available	  in	  only	  the	  most	  limited	  and	  exceptional	  
circumstances.	  When	  applied	  to	  geoengineering,	  these	  limitations	  all	  point	  in	  the	  same	  direction.	  
Could	  it	  be	  claimed	  that	  geoengineering	  is	  “the	  only	  means	  for	  the	  State	  to	  safeguard	  an	  essential	  
interest”	  (Ref	  23,	  Article	  25(1)(a))?	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  in	  the	  climate	  context	  States	  have	  at	  present	  
options	  of	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation.	  Further,	  the	  climatic	  catastrophe	  faced	  in	  order	  to	  be	  an	  
emergency	  properly	  so-­‐called	  would	  need	  to	  threaten	  “grave	  and	  imminent	  peril”	  (Ref	  23,	  Article	  
25(1)(a),	  emphasis	  added).	  The	  interpretation	  of	  these	  combined	  elements	  has	  been	  squarely	  
addressed	  by	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  in	  its	  landmark	  decision	  Gabčíkovo–
Nagymaros.28	  The	  ICJ	  accepted	  that	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  (by	  Hungary)	  against	  a	  future	  
environmental	  threat	  related	  to	  an	  essential	  interest	  (Ref	  29,	  para	  53).	  Moreover	  the	  peril	  in	  
question	  need	  not	  be	  imminent	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  occurring	  proximately.	  As	  the	  Court	  noted	  “a	  ‘peril’	  
appearing	  in	  the	  long	  term	  might	  be	  held	  to	  be	  ‘imminent’	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  is	  established…the	  
realization	  of	  that	  peril,	  however	  far	  off	  it	  might	  be,	  is	  not	  thereby	  any	  less	  certain	  and	  inevitable.”	  
(Ref	  29,	  para.	  54)	  This	  then	  places	  considerable	  importance	  on	  the	  task	  of	  ‘establishing’	  a	  climatic	  
peril,	  so	  as	  to	  justify	  preventative	  deployment.	  It	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  considerably	  more	  demanding	  
so	  to	  do	  in	  a	  climate	  case	  than	  in	  the	  context	  of	  dam.	  	  
As	  a	  concrete	  standard,	  the	  plea	  of	  necessity	  is	  considerably	  more	  refined	  than	  the	  more	  amorphous	  
tests	  often	  deployed	  in	  the	  geoengineering	  literature	  and	  is	  not	  easily	  satisfied	  by	  them.	  Can	  it	  be	  
said	  that	  geoengineering	  “does	  not	  seriously	  impair	  an	  interest	  of	  the	  State	  or	  States	  towards	  which	  
the	  obligation	  exists	  or	  of	  the	  international	  community	  as	  a	  whole”,	  given	  the	  risk	  of	  un-­‐intended	  
regional	  and	  global	  side-­‐effects	  (Ref	  23,	  Article	  25(1)(b))?	  And	  given	  that	  necessity	  can	  only	  be	  
invoked	  by	  those	  that	  have	  not	  “contributed	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  necessity”,	  which	  is	  far	  from	  
obviously	  true	  for	  the	  States	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  deploy	  geoengineering,	  it	  appears	  
to	  have	  little	  traction	  in	  current	  contexts	  (Ref	  23,	  Article	  25(2)(b)).	  As	  the	  ICJ	  stated	  in	  Gabčíkovo,	  an	  
argument	  on	  the	  state	  of	  necessity	  is	  unconvincing	  unless	  it	  was	  “at	  least	  proven	  that	  a	  real,	  ‘grave’	  
and	  ‘imminent’	  ‘peril’	  existed…and	  that	  the	  measures	  taken…were	  the	  only	  possible	  response	  to	  it”	  
(Ref	  29,	  para.	  54).	  The	  question	  is	  then:	  can	  we	  identify	  grave	  and	  imminent	  peril,	  and	  is	  geo-­‐
engineering	  the	  only	  possible	  response?	  
	  
3.	  Can	  climate	  emergency	  be	  defined	  scientifically	  and	  predicted?	  
That	  the	  Earth	  is	  facing	  a	  climate	  emergency	  is	  an	  increasingly	  common	  opinion	  expressed	  within	  the	  
climate	  science	  community.	  For	  example,	  the	  recent	  unprecedented	  and	  largely	  unforeseen	  (in	  
model	  projections)	  record	  Arctic	  Sea	  ice-­‐melt	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  2012	  was	  described	  as	  a	  
“planetary	  emergency”	  by	  Prof	  James	  Hansen,	  and	  prompted	  Prof	  Peter	  Wadhams	  to	  state	  that	  
“desperate	  measures	  such	  as	  considering	  geoengineering	  techniques	  as	  well	  as	  conducting	  a	  major	  
nuclear	  programme”	  should	  be	  considered.30	  	  
Defining	  any	  aspect	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  an	  ‘emergency’	  is	  fraught	  with	  both	  scientific	  subjectivity	  
and	  uncertainty.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  impact	  (either	  occurring	  or	  forecast)	  of	  a	  changed	  
climate	  on	  nations,	  societies	  and	  economies	  and	  environments,	  rather	  than	  the	  changed	  climate	  
itself	  that	  is	  perhaps	  most	  likely	  to	  demand	  political	  response.	  	  Here,	  we	  find	  it	  instructive	  to	  
examine	  the	  recent	  discussion	  of	  ‘tipping	  points’	  or	  ‘tipping	  elements’	  as	  an	  example	  of	  possible	  
emergency	  scenarios.	  	  	  	  
Tipping	  elements	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  points	  or	  conditions	  in	  major	  Earth	  systems	  which	  could	  
reach	  a	  moment	  of	  no-­‐return	  or	  system-­‐shift	  beyond	  which	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  state	  emerges.31	  
If	  such	  ‘points	  of	  no	  return’	  leading	  to	  deemed	  crippling	  climate	  states	  can	  be	  identified,	  and	  should	  
they	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  imminently	  exceeded,	  geoengineering	  might	  be	  considered	  the	  only	  option	  
and	  therefore	  a	  necessity.	  Lenton	  et	  al.	  explore	  possible	  tipping	  elements	  of	  the	  climate	  system,	  
identifying	  nine	  global-­‐scale	  “policy-­‐relevant”	  candidates,	  see	  table	  1.15	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
the	  nature	  of	  these	  tipping	  elements	  is	  not	  well	  understood.	  While	  Lenton	  et	  al.	  consider	  all	  to	  be	  
“policy	  relevant”,15	  only	  three	  (Arctic	  summer	  sea	  ice,	  Indian	  summer	  monsoon,	  West	  Africa	  
monsoon)	  are	  identified	  as	  having	  a	  decadal	  or	  lower	  timescale	  –	  a	  clearly	  politically	  relevant	  
timescale	  for	  undertaking	  immediate	  responsive	  action.	  By	  contrast,	  sea-­‐level	  rise	  threatens	  many	  of	  
the	  world’s	  most	  populous	  and	  economically	  significant	  regions,	  but	  its	  timescale	  of	  centuries	  does	  
not	  easily	  fit	  with	  that	  of	  current	  political	  (or	  indeed	  broader	  societal)	  systems	  or	  processes:	  grave	  
but	  not	  imminent	  peril.	  
While	  these	  three	  sub-­‐decadal-­‐timescale	  tipping	  elements	  would	  result	  in	  huge	  change,	  only	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  failure	  of	  the	  Indian	  monsoon	  is	  it	  virtually	  certain	  that	  the	  impact	  would	  be	  incontrovertibly	  
negative.	  While	  Artic	  summer	  sea	  ice	  loss	  is	  undoubtedly	  already	  impacting	  Arctic	  communities	  and	  
the	  Artic	  ecosystem	  (and	  influencing	  mid-­‐latitude	  weather	  patterns),32,33	  it	  is	  conversely	  seen	  by	  
some	  as	  potentially	  advantageous	  in	  enabling	  access	  to	  previously	  inaccessible	  resources,	  and	  
opening	  of	  shipping	  routes.34,35	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  West	  Africa	  monsoon,	  Lenton	  et	  al.	  reflect	  that	  
such	  a	  change	  could	  indeed	  be	  perceived	  as	  benefiting	  the	  region	  by	  possibly	  enabling	  agricultural	  
expansion	  into	  presently	  arid	  regions.15	  	  
Calculating	  costs	  and	  benefits	  is	  not	  our	  interest	  here.	  But	  following	  this	  line	  of	  argument,	  broad	  
conditions	  might	  be	  suggested	  for	  delineating	  a	  ‘climate	  emergency’	  event	  or	  events	  that	  might	  
encourage,	  demand	  or	  result	  in	  an	  emergency	  response	  involving	  consideration	  of	  geoengineering	  
deployment,	  given	  strong	  scientific	  evidence	  and	  public	  awareness:	  
1) Phenomenon(a)	  occurs	  rapidly	  –	  impacts	  with	  a	  sub-­‐decadal	  timescale.	  
2) Phenomenon(a)	  is	  created	  or	  significantly	  exacerbated	  by	  anthropogenic	  forcing	  of	  the	  
Earth’s	  climate.	  
3) Phenomenon(a)	  has	  a	  globally	  significant	  impact	  –	  ecologically,	  economically	  and	  socially.	  
In	  this	  context	  the	  normal	  manoeuvre	  is	  to	  call	  for	  greater	  research	  to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  to	  better	  
guide	  interventions	  now	  or	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  U.S.	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  report,	  for	  
example,	  asks	  for	  more	  data,	  better	  understanding	  of	  ‘the	  climate	  and	  a	  way	  to	  determine	  when	  a	  
“climate	  emergency”	  is	  reached	  …	  information	  on	  climate	  system	  thresholds,	  reversibility,	  and	  
abrupt	  changes	  to	  inform	  societal	  debate	  and	  decision-­‐making	  over	  what	  would	  constitute	  a	  
“climate	  emergency”	  and	  whether	  deployment	  of	  a	  geoengineering	  approach	  would	  be	  merited’	  
(Ref	  36,	  p	  16).	  Similarly,	  the	  UK’s	  Parliamentary	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  concludes	  that	  the	  
science	  of	  geoengineering	  was	  not	  sufficiently	  advanced	  to	  make	  the	  technology	  predictable	  (Ref	  37,	  
p	  24),	  and	  that	  greater	  certainty	  is	  needed.	  	  
The	  request	  for	  more	  data	  to	  reduce	  future	  uncertainties	  into	  calculable	  and	  governable	  space	  has	  
been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  risk-­‐based	  governance	  for	  decades16;	  its	  role	  in	  geoengineering	  is	  to	  be	  
expected.	  This	  desire	  for	  greater	  certainty	  is	  however	  unhelpful.	  As	  sociologists	  of	  science	  have	  been	  
arguing	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  a	  focus	  on	  quantified,	  probabilistic	  knowledge	  often	  obscures	  many	  of	  the	  
most	  salient	  aspects	  of	  risks.38	  Probabilistic	  predictions	  are	  possible	  only	  if	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem	  
that	  are	  not	  amenable	  to	  statistical	  analysis	  are	  treated	  separately,	  and	  either	  placed	  in	  the	  
background	  of	  the	  analysis	  or	  excluded	  entirely.	  Uncertainty	  is	  thus	  displaced	  rather	  than	  eliminated.	  
So,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  preventative	  action,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  –	  or	  ever	  will	  be	  –	  able	  to	  
reliably	  predict	  any	  of	  these	  conditions,	  including	  the	  actual	  occurrence	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  (1).	  Only	  
for	  some	  of	  kinds	  of	  tipping	  points	  can	  we	  hope,	  one	  day,	  to	  determine	  the	  probability	  in	  advance.39	  
And	  given	  the	  difficulty	  and	  time	  it	  may	  take	  to	  establish	  such	  knowledge	  the	  scope	  for	  effective	  
forewarning	  is	  limited	  indeed.	  We	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  only	  limited	  evidence	  in	  advance	  or	  just	  
theoretical	  identification	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  catastrophe,	  and	  be	  forced	  to	  operate	  on	  levels	  4	  or	  5	  in	  
table	  2.	  
	  4.	  The	  pre-­‐emptive	  logic	  of	  the	  emergency	  frame	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  take	  a	  step	  back	  and	  consider	  how	  the	  emergency	  frame	  functions	  and	  emphasise	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  just	  an	  empirical	  question	  of	  prediction,	  calculation	  of	  risk	  and	  legal	  
precedent,	  but	  has	  a	  certain	  conceptual	  logic.	  We	  can	  usefully	  begin	  by	  contrasting	  arguments	  for	  
geo-­‐engineering	  ‘in	  case	  of	  emergency’	  –	  which	  as	  the	  introduction	  set	  out	  continue	  to	  underlie	  
many	  discussions	  of	  geo-­‐engineering	  both	  implicitly	  and	  explicitly	  –	  with	  those	  that	  argue	  for	  geo-­‐
engineering	  as	  part	  of	  a	  portfolio	  of	  climate	  mitigation	  options.	  There	  are	  similarities	  between	  the	  
two	  styles	  of	  argument.	  Both	  are	  oriented	  to	  managing	  future	  threat;	  both	  are	  circumscribed	  by	  
uncertainties;	  both	  claim	  to	  be	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  greater	  ‘common	  good’,	  be	  that	  future	  
generations,	  late	  industrial	  ways	  of	  life,	  or	  the	  integrity	  of	  earth	  processes.	  However,	  these	  
similarities	  mask	  an	  important	  distinction:	  mitigation	  is	  predominantly	  precautionary	  in	  its	  
orientation	  to	  the	  future,	  as	  opposed	  to	  geoengineering	  ‘in	  case	  of	  emergency’	  which	  is	  pre-­‐
emptive.40	  	  
The	  point	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  is	  to	  act	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  proven	  risk,	  on	  flimsier	  evidence	  -­‐	  
but	  not	  none	  (table	  2	  therefore	  identifies	  precaution	  with	  level	  3	  and	  pre-­‐emption	  with	  level	  4).	  
There	  may	  be	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  future	  dangers,	  but	  the	  costs	  of	  acting	  now	  (to	  
whatever	  degree	  as	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  policy	  or	  politics)	  are	  deemed	  preferable	  to	  waiting.	  If	  
precaution	  is	  about	  avoiding	  something	  for	  which	  there	  is	  some	  evidence,	  then	  pre-­‐emption	  is	  about	  
dealing	  with	  something	  that	  is	  thought	  possible,	  but	  for	  which	  there	  is	  less	  evidence,	  and	  less	  
certainty	  (level	  4	  of	  Table	  2).	  The	  logic	  of	  pre-­‐emption	  is	  that	  (1)	  there	  are	  potential	  emergencies	  in	  
the	  future	  (whether	  abrupt,	  or	  more	  spatially	  or	  temporally	  dispersed)	  so	  that	  (2)	  action	  is	  necessary	  
now	  to	  prevent	  such	  emergencies.	  	  Action	  in	  the	  present	  is	  therefore	  generative	  of	  certain	  futures,	  in	  
that	  it	  seeks	  to	  organise	  what	  may	  and	  may	  not	  emerge	  to	  avoid	  certain	  pathways	  or	  prevent	  certain	  
predicted	  outcomes	  in	  favour	  of	  other,	  preferred	  outcomes.20	  Action	  is	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
something	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  happened,	  and	  which	  may	  –	  or	  may	  not	  –	  come	  to	  pass	  (levels	  4	  and	  5	  of	  
our	  typology	  in	  Table	  2).	  The	  specific	  nature	  of	  the	  climate	  emergency	  is	  less	  important	  –	  it	  is	  more	  
that	  there	  is	  some	  potential	  inherent	  in	  current	  predicted	  futures	  that	  we	  need	  to	  act	  to	  change	  
now.	  Hence	  calls,	  such	  as	  Bickell’s,41	  that	  waiting	  for	  an	  emergency	  to	  happen	  is	  folly	  and	  that	  
geoengineering	  should	  be	  researched	  and	  even	  deployed	  in	  advance.	  In	  fact,	  Bickell	  argues	  that	  the	  
mere	  potential	  of	  catastrophe	  is	  enough,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  not	  wait	  for	  any	  firm	  evidence.	  
Table	  3	  maps	  this	  in	  deliberately	  exaggerated	  fashion	  (for	  a	  broader	  overview	  see	  Ref	  20).	  Geo-­‐
engineering	  can	  use	  either	  a	  precautionary	  or	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  logic,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  both.	  In	  
precaution,	  action	  is	  contingent	  on	  a	  known	  risk	  (rising	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  their	  likely	  deleterious	  
impacts);	  for	  pre-­‐emption,	  action	  is	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  a	  contingent	  threat	  with	  less	  empirical	  
evidence	  (potential	  climate	  emergencies).	  Arguments	  that	  use	  the	  case	  of	  emergency	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
justify	  research	  and	  potential	  deployment	  of	  geo-­‐engineering	  employ	  a	  distinctly	  different	  logic	  to	  
those	  who	  argue	  for	  geo-­‐engineering	  as	  a	  precautionary	  technique	  to	  deal	  with	  threats	  that	  work	  on	  
Level	  3.	  The	  key	  difference	  is	  in	  the	  bottom-­‐right	  box:	  whereas	  precaution	  is	  a	  more	  humble	  attempt	  
to	  manage	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  climate	  risk,	  pre-­‐emption	  is	  about	  intentionally	  shaping	  the	  future,	  
about	  grasping	  it	  and	  making	  certain	  things	  happen.	  	  
Moreover,	  any	  interventions	  in	  complex	  earth	  systems	  that	  have	  positive	  (however	  measured)	  
impacts	  would	  also	  bring	  unintended	  (both	  positive	  and	  negative)	  consequences.	  Any	  
geoengineering	  intervention	  would	  make	  new	  climates	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  tend	  to	  exceed	  
intention,42,43	  and	  these	  would	  need	  to	  be	  managed	  to	  avoid	  geoengineering	  causing	  its	  own	  cascade	  
of	  potential	  future	  emergencies.	  This	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  control	  evoked	  by	  
geoengineering	  as	  a	  climate	  management	  technique,	  instead	  creating	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  cycle	  of	  new	  
emergency	  visions	  and	  interventions.	  To	  get	  around	  the	  uncertainty	  involved	  in	  any	  potential	  
geoengineering	  intervention	  commentators	  frequently	  distinguish	  between	  deployment	  and	  
research.	  In	  our	  analysis,	  however,	  such	  a	  distinction	  does	  little	  to	  avoid	  an	  emergency	  framing	  or	  
lessen	  its	  force.	  First,	  arguments	  for	  research	  are	  usually	  presented	  as	  a	  need	  to	  insure	  against	  and	  
prepare	  for	  potential	  future	  emergencies,	  and	  thus	  invoke	  an	  emergency	  to	  come,	  potential	  surprise	  
and	  uncertainty	  as	  justification.	  Second,	  research	  is	  strongly	  linked	  to	  deployment:	  greater	  
knowledge	  about	  technologies,	  earth	  systems	  and	  impacts	  makes	  deployment	  more,	  not	  less,	  likely.	  
Because	  pre-­‐emptive	  logic	  thrives	  off	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  future	  climate	  emergencies	  more	  
research,	  rather	  than	  reducing	  uncertainty,	  will	  cause	  visions	  of	  emergency	  to	  proliferate.	  We	  are	  at	  
a	  stage	  where	  we	  risk	  emergency	  being	  ‘buried’	  as	  a	  frame	  –	  sometimes	  unspoken,	  more	  often	  not	  –	  
at	  the	  heart	  of	  geoengineering,	  and	  distinguishing	  between	  deployment	  and	  research	  is	  not	  a	  valid	  
tactic	  to	  address	  this.	  
Essentially,	  our	  point	  in	  previous	  sections	  was	  that	  calculating	  the	  chances	  of	  climate	  emergencies,	  
legal	  pathways	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  any	  deployment	  are	  hedged	  with	  an	  irreducible	  (which	  is	  not	  to	  
say	  unmanageable)	  level	  of	  uncertainty.	  We	  can	  broadly	  suggest	  that	  geoengineering	  would	  most	  
likely	  involve,	  in	  some	  form	  or	  other,	  firstly,	  forming	  an	  ‘idea	  of	  a	  possible	  climate	  to	  be	  achieved	  
and	  secondly,	  actualising	  that	  form	  by	  somehow	  impressing	  it	  onto	  the	  matter	  of	  climate’	  (Ref	  44,	  p	  
233).	  Whether	  this	  is	  done	  according	  to	  a	  precautionary	  or	  pre-­‐emptive	  logic	  matters	  a	  great	  deal,	  
we	  suggest,	  since	  the	  capacity	  for	  emergency	  arguments	  to	  close	  down	  space	  for	  deliberation	  and	  
politics	  is	  well	  known.42,45	  Acting	  under	  the	  threatening	  shadow	  of	  emergency,	  we	  are	  unlikely	  to	  
make	  good	  decisions.12	  This	  section	  has	  suggested	  that	  different	  logics	  underlie	  different	  ways	  of	  
justifying	  geoengineering,	  and	  that	  pre-­‐emptive	  arguments	  about	  emergency	  operate	  on	  a	  higher	  
level	  of	  abstraction,	  uncertainty	  and	  hubris	  than	  those	  which	  advocate	  precaution.	  Given	  their	  
allure,	  ‘arguments	  from	  emergency’	  will	  continue	  to	  underlie	  the	  debate	  about	  research	  and	  
deployment,	  even	  when	  not	  explicitly	  articulated,	  and	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	  to	  understand	  their	  form,	  
force	  and	  function.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
We	  began	  this	  paper	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  arguments	  for	  geoengineering	  usually	  invoke	  ‘emergency’	  
in	  several	  ways:	  a	  climate	  emergency	  to	  come;	  an	  emergency	  in	  climate	  policy;	  the	  risk	  of	  any	  
deployment	  causing	  further	  unforeseen	  climate	  impacts	  –	  new	  emergencies.	  We	  then	  addressed	  
two	  important	  correlates	  of	  the	  emergency	  frame:	  necessity	  and	  uncertainty.	  We	  asked	  if	  ‘necessity’	  
in	  international	  law	  was	  a	  plausible	  starting	  point	  for	  legally	  justifying	  the	  emergency	  deployment	  of	  
geoengineering.	  One	  of	  several	  obstacles	  to	  such	  a	  justification	  is	  the	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  analyse	  
‘grave	  and	  imminent	  peril’,	  since	  our	  scientific	  ability	  to	  reliably	  predict	  climate	  emergencies	  is	  
limited.	  And	  given	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  establish	  scientific	  facts	  as	  well	  as	  wider	  acceptance,	  the	  scope	  
for	  effective	  forewarning	  is	  limited	  indeed.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  scientific	  production	  of	  knowledge	  
about	  emergency	  does	  not	  –	  apart	  from	  in	  very	  limited	  circumstances	  –	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  
legal	  definition	  of	  necessity.	  	  
Pre-­‐emptive	  geoengineering	  therefore	  sits	  very	  uneasily	  with	  the	  time-­‐worn	  standards	  of	  the	  law	  on	  
necessity.	  Advocates	  of	  geoengineering	  as	  emergency	  prevention	  might	  argue	  that	  this	  clash	  should	  
be	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  this	  legal	  framework,	  proposing	  that	  it	  should	  be	  modified	  to	  
accommodate	  threats	  of	  limited	  predictability.	  More	  should	  be	  done	  to	  analyse	  how	  legal	  
assessments	  of	  necessity	  have	  coped	  with	  uncertain	  predictions.	  More	  research	  is	  also	  needed	  on	  
the	  relation	  between	  necessity	  pleas	  and	  other	  governance	  mechanisms	  for	  geoengineering	  
deployment.	  It	  would,	  for	  example,	  be	  interesting	  to	  investigate	  whether	  there	  are	  circumstances	  
under	  which	  the	  necessity	  standard	  would	  be	  trumped	  or	  by-­‐passed,	  and	  whether	  such	  
circumstances	  could	  be	  constructed	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  the	  problems	  of	  pre-­‐emption	  irrelevant.	  
Ultimately,	  however,	  pre-­‐emptive	  arguments	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  poor	  foundations	  for	  legal	  
deliberations.	  
We	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  emergency	  frame	  feeds	  off	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  future.	  This	  means	  
that,	  since	  increased	  knowledge	  and	  research	  can	  never	  dispel	  all	  uncertainty	  about	  climate	  futures	  
or	  geoengineering	  impacts,	  increased	  knowledge	  and	  research	  cannot	  dispel	  the	  emergency	  frame.	  
Therefore	  pre-­‐emptive	  justifications	  for	  geoengineering	  will	  proliferate	  alongside	  different	  levels	  of	  
uncertainty.	  We	  deem	  it	  unlikely	  that	  the	  emergency	  frame	  will	  go	  away.	  This	  need	  not	  determine	  
future	  policy.	  Further	  research	  could	  usefully	  look	  into	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  power	  of	  pre-­‐emptive	  logics	  
and	  compare	  their	  use	  in	  geoengineering	  to	  other	  areas.	  
While	  recognising	  that	  dangerous,	  large-­‐scale	  impacts	  from	  climate	  change	  are	  now	  more	  likely,	  this	  
paper	  cautions	  against	  any	  use	  of	  an	  emergency	  logic	  in	  climate	  policy.	  We	  suggest	  that	  merely	  
ignoring	  or	  repressing	  the	  question	  of	  emergency	  is	  not	  the	  correct	  response	  (not	  least	  because	  this	  
will	  drive	  the	  emergency	  frame	  underground,	  to	  lie	  latent	  where	  it	  is	  not	  explicitly	  articulated	  within	  
justifications	  for	  geoengineering).	  Instead,	  one	  useful	  task	  is	  to	  further	  defuse	  and	  disarm	  emergency	  
rhetoric.	  Pleas	  to	  reduce	  scientific	  uncertainty	  will	  not	  help	  here,	  but	  rather	  the	  task	  requires	  greater	  
deliberation,	  a	  less	  shrill	  form	  of	  politics	  and	  more	  reflexive	  justifications	  for	  research	  from	  
scientists.	  To	  that	  end	  we	  also	  opened	  up	  a	  distinction	  within	  geoengineering	  based	  on	  
precautionary	  against	  pre-­‐emptive	  approaches.	  What	  a	  ‘precautionary’	  approach	  to	  geoengineering	  
might	  look	  like	  is	  a	  question	  for	  further	  consideration:	  it	  may	  well	  exclude	  fast,	  high	  leverage	  
interventions.	  
Our	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  emergency	  frame	  has	  been	  a	  mixed	  blessing	  for	  geoengineering.	  The	  
emergency	  frame	  has	  an	  emotive	  rhetoric	  that	  suggests	  geoengineering	  is	  necessary	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  the	  
future,	  and	  this	  emotive	  character	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  challenge,	  hard	  to	  resist	  and	  even	  harder	  to	  
move	  beyond.	  The	  emergency	  frame	  tempts	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  correct	  response	  to	  climate	  
change	  is	  to	  prepare	  for	  deliberate	  large	  scale	  manipulation	  of	  the	  planetary	  environment.	  Given	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  challenge	  and	  the	  growing	  inertia	  behind	  geoengineering	  it	  is	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  
to	  resist	  the	  pre-­‐emptive	  logic	  of	  the	  argument	  that,	  in	  case	  of	  emergency,	  we	  should	  ‘press	  here’.	  
	  
Notes	  
a)	  Entman	  (1993)	  defined	  framing	  as	  “to	  select	  some	  aspects	  of	  a	  perceived	  reality	  and	  make	  them	  
more	  salient	  in	  a	  communicating	  text,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  promote	  a	  particular	  problem	  definition,	  
causal	  interpretation,	  moral	  evaluation,	  and/or	  treatment	  recommendation	  for	  the	  item	  described”.  
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Table	  1	  Possible	  tipping	  elements	  
Tipping	  element	   Timescale	   Primary	  impacts	  
Arctic	  summer	  sea	  ice	  	   ~10yr	   Amplified	  warming	  and	  ecosystem	  change	  
Greenland	  ice	  sheet	  	   >300yr	   Sea	  level	  rise	  
West	  Antarctica	  ice	  sheet	  	   >300yr	   Sea	  level	  rise	  
Atlantic	  thermohaline	  
circulation	  	  
~100yr	   Regional	  cooling	  sea-­‐level	  rise,	  and	  ITCZb	  shift	  
El	  Nino-­‐Southern	  oscillation	  	   ~100yr	   Drought	  in	  SE	  Asia	  and	  elsewhere	  
Indian	  summer	  monsoon	  	   ~1yr	   Drought	  
Sahara/Sahel	  and	  West	  Africa	  
monsoon	  	  
~10yr	   Increased	  precipitation	  
Amazon	  rainforest	  	   ~50yr	   Biodiversity	  loss	  and	  decreased	  rainfall	  
Boreal	  forest	  	   ~50yr	  	   Biome	  switch	  –	  e.g.	  replacement	  by	  temperate	  
grassland	  and	  desert	  
	  
Table	  2	  Levels	  of	  (un)certainty	  for	  climate	  threats	   	  
	   Epistemic	  condition	   Kind	  of	  analysis	  and	  legitimation	  of	  action	  possible.	  	  
1	   Scientific	  certainty	   Scientific	  consensus	  about	  existence,	  cause	  and	  impacts	  of	  
phenomenon.	  Can’t	  happen	  before	  the	  event.	  
2	   Probability	   The	  territory	  of	  classic	  risk	  analysis.	  
3	   Some	  empirical	  evidence	   But	  not	  enough	  for	  probabilistic	  risk	  analysis.	  Precautionary	  
action	  may	  be	  justified.	  
4	   Potential	  identified	   ‘Known	  unknowns’.	  From	  models	  and	  theory	  rather	  than	  
observation.	  Any	  action	  would	  be	  pre-­‐emptive.	  
5	   Unknown	  unknowns	   Impossible	  to	  know	  what	  to	  act	  against.	  
	  
Table	  3	  Contrasting	  logics	  of	  precaution	  and	  pre-­‐emption	  	  
Precautionary	  arguments	   Pre-­‐emptive	  arguments	  
Identified	  threat	  –	  climate	  change	  impacts	  –	  
abundant	  evidence,	  likely	  to	  occur	  unless	  we	  
take	  precautionary	  action.	  
Weakly	  identified	  /	  potential	  threat	  –	  tipping	  point,	  	  
climate	  emergency	  –	  contingent,	  i.e.	  may	  or	  may	  
not	  occur,	  depending	  on	  future	  events	  
Action	  –	  contingent	  on	  recognising	  the	  
necessity	  of	  the	  threat	  	  
Action	  –	  necessary	  now	  to	  shape	  the	  contingencies	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